Sebahate Shala
September 19, 2016
The long-pending issue of the United Nations’ (UN) reforms, including the Security Council’s enlargement and the restriction of the veto power, expects to gain another impasse this week when the world leaders embark in New York to attend the General Assembly (UNGA) 71st session. Discussions on the UNSC reforms have been ongoing since 1993—without any results so far. Disagreements on the categorization and membership criteria, the lack of general consensus on a viable option, as well as the objection of five permanent members (P5) to grant a right to veto to the new permanent members, account for some of the reasons.
The process, as experts warn, is going nowhere as the aspirant members want the veto power while the P5 is not willing to relinquish that right—guaranteed by the UN Charter. The Charter is one of the main obstacles to reforms. In order to change the UNSC composition, the Charter must be amended, which requires a “two-thirds” majority of the UNGA and an affirmative vote of the P5. The restriction of the veto power is another major proposal—part of the UNSC’s reforms. The “responsibility not to vote”—an element of the Responsibility to Protect (R2P) doctrine—though adopted by the SC and GA, and endorsed by the United States (US), remains incomplete and largely selective. Moreover, it had been invoked inconsistently.
Many Proposals—No Clear Roadmap How to Achieve Reforms
The proponents of the SCs enlargement argue that in its current composure, the SC does not reflect geopolitical realities of the current world. Moreover, it’s increasingly illegitimate and ineffective given its inequitable geographic composition, as well as non-democratic as it excludes the powerful nations and the largest contributors to the UN budget and peacekeeping operations. Two leading contenders—Japan and Germany—are among top-ten donors to the UN Peacekeeping fund (Toshitaka, 2016). Both members have warned that if not allocated to permanent seats, they will reduce their financing, which actually they did. Germany halved its donations—from 12.0 percent in 2013 to 6.4 percent in 2016 and Japan from 19.0 in 2013 to 16.0 percent in 2016 (Id.).
The issue of the equitable representation and increase of the SC membership was first discussed in 1993, resulting in a UNGA resolution establishing an Open-ended Working Group (OEWG) to consider all aspects relating to the UN reforms (UNGA, A/Res/48/26, 1993). Since then, many proposals have been circulated. Momentarily, six plans are on the table, including proposals of the Secretary-General High-Level Panels (SGHLP), the group of four (G4), the Small Five (S-5), the African Union, and the “Uniting for Consensus.” The SGHLPs has proposed two models, Model A and Model B. Model A proposes six new permanent seats and three non-permanent seats with no veto power for permanent members, while Model B suggests creating a new category of eight four-year renewable term seats: two for Africa, Asia and the Pacific, one for Europe and the Americas, and an additional non-permanent seat, expanding the SC to 24 members.
The G4, comprising Germany, Japan, Brazil, and India, insist to add six new permanent seats with the veto power additionally to four non-permanent seats, increasing the SC to 25 members (The G4, Res. A/59/L.64G4). In the same line stands the African Union, too, seeking permanent seats for Africa and Latin America entitled to veto power. The “Uniting for Consensus,” on the other side, is against new permanent seats and veto expansion, proposing 20 non-permanent members elected by the UNGA with a two-year mandate and based on their contribution to the UN peace and security. The S-5, meanwhile, seeks the improvement of the SCs working methods and some guidelines on the use of the veto.
None of these plans have garnered enough support as to change the UN Charter. Moreover, these proposals, according to Davis, are “unrealistic, flawed and politically infeasible” as they cannot sufficiently increase the legitimacy and effectiveness of the SC, or adequately address the issue of greater democratic process (2010). First, Models A and B, as Davis argues, avoid regional groupings used by the GA to elect the non-permanent members, by substituting it with a new ordering of the globe based on a simplistic categorization of five world regions. Second, they fail to effectively address the veto power, the size of the SC and the new members. Additionally, these plans do not provide a recommendation on the new majority required for the SC action (Id.). Furthermore, Models A and B, as Luck notices, lack the detailed information on the status of permanent seats—whether it should be extended or not, whether the veto should be retained, modified, or eliminated, and how decisions should be taken (2010; 2015). Moreover, the SGHLP, as both Davis and Luck argue, failed to agree on a unanimous plan, opening the possibility for a third viable proposal. In fact, the then-Secretary General, Annan, urged member states to consider a third option in terms of size and balance on the basis of either model, which they failed to do so.
The discussions on the UN reforms are proceeded through the Intergovernmental Negotiations Group (ING) on the SC reforms and informal channels. Based on a document issued in June 2016, the ING principally agreed on an enlarged SC with a membership between 21-27; seats will be allocated based on the “category of membership” and “regional representation” criteria to ensure a balance between the representativeness and effectiveness (ING, June 22, 2016).
Battling for a Middle Ground: “Semi-permanent” vs. “Adaptation” Approach
The agreement of the P5, respectively the U.S., Russia, and China, is one of the major obstacles to the reformation process. These countries have opposed any options granting veto power to the new permanent members under the fear that it would diminish their power. Publicly, the U.S. maintains that the international architecture is buckling and needs to be renovated (The White House, National Security Strategy, 2010) Eventually, the American administration endorsed Japan, Germany and India’s bids, although as Wikileaks revealed in 2007, the administration had done anything to prevent the SC expansion using its backdoor channels. Similarly, Russia is declared against the SC enlargement though it endorsed India’s bid in 2015, while China opposes any reform that would provide Japan a permanent seat to the UNSC (Ananth Krishnan, Daily Mail India, February 2, 2015).
The U.S. role in this process is crucial. The Council on Foreign Relations urged the Obama administration to publicly support reforms by laying out a long-term roadmap, incorporating several major aspirant countries to new permanent seats through a condition-based and evolutionary process. According to McDonald and Patrick, a more compelling reason for U.S. to support the UNSC enlargement is the concern that an unchanged Council would become increasingly ineffective in addressing the today’s security challenges (Council on Foreign Relations, 2010). Likewise, Bosco called upon the U.S. administration to “immediately act,” avoiding situations when a group of countries create coalitions and gain the “two-thirds” of votes, necessitated to amend the Charter (Council on Foreign Relations, 2013; 2015). Bosco considers the “semi-permanent option” as the best available solution for the U.S. and other permanent members, for it leaves the P5 and veto power unchanged while adding six new “semi-permanent” seats, thus keeping the SC manageable. As such, the plan would be approved by Congress (Id.).
Proponents of reforms maintain that the SC expansion would enhance the Council’s legitimacy, effectiveness and authority while the restriction of veto power could broaden its appeal (Freisleben, 2008). Furthermore, reforms would make the Council more representative on a regional basis, reflecting the power shift and the new world order. For example, Africa with 1.2 billion people is represented by only two non-permanent members even though it covers about 70 percent of the UNSC agenda. Asia, consisting of 53 countries and with over half of the population in the world, is represented only by China and two non-permanent members.
Opponents, on the other side, remain skeptical that the SC enlargement would improve its effectiveness. As Weiss put it, “Though it would enhance legitimacy, an SC of 21 or 25 members would hardly improve effectiveness; the group would be too large to conduct serious negotiations and still too small to represent the UN membership as a whole.” (2003; 2005) Rather than enlarging the Council, the efforts, according to Davis, should be focused on other means of enhancing the legitimacy, particularly with regard to using the force under Chapter VII (2010). Weiss proposes an evolutionary vs. revolutionary approach or as he calls it, an “adaptation” process by leaving the SC in its current structure while enhancing its legitimacy and efficiency (2003; 2005). Momentarily, this model, as Weiss holds, is the best acceptable solution since there is no general consensus on this matter. In current conditions, any substantial change is impossible as it requires the change of the UN Charter, which is unlikely to happen (Id.). The amendment of the Charter needs a two-thirds majority of the GA or 128 members, then it must be ratified by two-thirds of the GA and an affirmative vote of P5. Even if the U.S. principally agrees, yet the amendment of the Charter must be ratified by the Congress (Id.).
“Responsibility not to Vote”: Selective and Incomplete
While I was doing an internship at the UN during the GA annual session in September 2015, the then President of France, Hollande urged member of the Security Council to suspend their veto in cases when the human lives are at stake. He was referring to the tragedy in Syria. “The right to veto as introduced when the UN was founded was not a right to block action. Vote is a duty to act. Vote is not a privilege but a responsibility to act,” said Hollande in his address to the UNGA (UNGA, October 28, 2015). Since 2013, when the principle of “code of conduct” was launched, France has pushed for the UNSC reforms to avoid the blockade on issues falling under Chapter VII. French Government proposed the SCs enlargement with permanent seats for G4, Africa, and an Arab country to make it more effective and representative.
The idea is however older. It was former French Foreign Minister, Vedrine, who proposed the “code of conduct” or the “Responsibility not to Vote” in a forum of the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) in 2000, in response to the SCs failure to prevent genocide and ethnic cleansing in Rwanda, Bosnia and Kosovo. In 2001, the ICSS framed the R2P concept, calling the P5 to refrain themselves from using the veto power to halt or avert an actual or comprehended “mass slaughter” or “large-scale ethnic cleansing” when a government is unable or unwilling to protect its populations. Synonymous concepts—“the right to intervene” and “sovereignty as responsibility” were used as earlier as the late 1980s. The “right to intervene” was first proposed by Kushner, the co-founder of Medicine San Frontiers, in 1987, while “sovereignty as responsibility”—by Deng, the former UN Special Rapporteur on Human Rights of the IDPs.
The “code of conduct,” as stipulated by France, urges the permanent members to voluntarily and collectively pledge not to use the veto in cases of recognized mass atrocities, excluding in situations where the national interests of the P5 are in questions. The principle aims at increasing the legitimacy and preserving the credibility of the SC, conveying the message that the protection of human life is a true priority, and preventing the member states from becoming prisoners of their own principled positions. For the principle to be applied, at least 50 member states should demand from the Secretary-General to determine the nature of the crime. Once the existence of the crime is confirmed, the “code of conduct” applies immediately. To come about that, according to Evans, there must be some conditions in place. First, creating a general sense of international pressure for change; second, clarifying conditions or modalities by identifying clearly what P5 are and are not; and third, offering protective conditions for the P5 members—some reassurances that they will not be doing themselves any harm by agreeing to voluntary restraint (2013). The restriction of the veto power, as Evans suggests, helps increase the effectiveness of the UN while enhancing credibility and legitimacy of the SC—whose structure does not reflect geopolitical realities of the twenty-first century (Id.).
The R2P principle seems like an achievable option as it does not require the amendment of the UN Charter. The principle was unanimously adopted at the 2005 “Millennium Summit Outcome” and appeared in various resolutions of the SC and GA (UNGA, A/59/2005; A/59/L.64). Further, the “Responsibility not to Vote” has gained great momentum, in particular, in the wake of the humanitarian crisis in Syria and is backed by around 40 governments, including the U.S., and a number of non-government organizations. Greater support was given by the Commission on Global Security, Justice and Governance (CGSJG) led by former Secretary of State, Albright. In 2015, this commission released a report, urging member states to strengthen the “Responsibility to Prevent, Protect, and Rebuild” through investing in early-warning capabilities and R2P action plans while recommending the expansion of the SC and the restriction of veto power (2015).
Yet in practice, the R2P, as Luck argues, remains incomplete in terms of either preventing genocide and other atrocities or offering a modicum of protection to vulnerable populations. “The ability of the R2P to deliver has been mixed: the principle was used either too little as in Somalia, ineffectively as in Darfur or employed effectively as in Kenya.” (2010; 2015) According to other authors, the R2P has been selective, referring to the U.S. military intervention in Libya under the primary justifications to prevent Gadaff from attacking the opposition stronghold of Benghazi. In Syria, meanwhile, where actual atrocities have been committed, the R2P has remained silent. Moreover, as Bellamy argues, the R2P has been invoked inconsistently: for example, in Sudan, Somalia, Iraq, and Afghanistan, despite the committed crimes or credibly threatened, the R2P was not invoked (2010).
Generally, the SC is criticized for failing to prevent mass atrocities from happening by pursuing a reactive vs. proactive approach, as well as for being selective. In cases of Cambodia and Rwanda, for example, the UNSC turned “one eye blind” while in the case of Palestine, it has failed to bring a resolution that would permanently resolve the Palestinian status. Based on the data of the UN Dag Hammarskjold Library, the U.S. and Russia hold the record on using the veto in situations relating to international peace and security. Since 1945, Russia has cast its veto 275 times while the US—83 times. Since the first use in 1970, the U.S. has used the veto more than any other permanent member. These statistics indicate that the SCs expansion by 2020, is far from happening.
Work cited:
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